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ON THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 
 
J. Adam Carter (University of Edinburgh) & Martin Peterson (Eindhoven University of Technology) 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for 
one who aspires to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an 
application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of 
defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated 
by the de minimis principle. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since its 1992 inclusion in the U.N. Rio Conference on Sustainable Development, what has come to 
be called the precautionary principle has increasingly been used as a key decision rule in environmental and 
health decision making.1 The key intuition motivating the precautionary principle is that, at least in some 
circumstances, the rational decision is to act rather than to wait for more information to come in. By 
reference to the precautionary principle, if a potential damage is serious enough, we should go ahead and 
take action against an activity that credibly threatens such damage. This is so even if a connection linking 
the activity under consideration to the potential damage is by scientific standards not conclusively 
established (or, indeed, perhaps far from established). 
 Among the most common objections raised against the principle are that it is ill-defined2, 
absolutist3, incoherent4, a value judgement5, increases risk-taking6, and marginalizes science.7 It falls 
outside our aim to evaluate these objections.8 Rather, we want to raise two distinctly epistemological 
puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an 
application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a 
plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by the de minimis principle, 
according to which far-fetched risks can be effectively ignored.  
In §2 we explain why the epistemological condition that features in the precautionary principle 
has to be formulated in a more nuanced way than commentators have recognized, and in §3 and §4 we 
                                                      
1 The formulation in the Rio Declaration states: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
2 See Bodansky (1992). 
3 See Nollkaemper (1996). 
4 See Peterson (2006). 
5 See Charnley (1999). 
6 See Gay & Brewers (1996). 
7 See Gay & Brewers (1996). 
8 See Sandin et. al (2002) for a defense of the precautionary principle against five of these charges. 
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present our two epistemological puzzles. The first epistemological puzzle involves a dilemma that arises 
once we compare invariantist and contextualist approaches to the matter of whether epistemic standards 
that must be met depend on the severity of the anticipated damage.  The second problem concerns the 
task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by de 
minimis. We claim that the application of the precautionary principle in combination with the de minimis 
principle raises issues discussed in the debate over contextualism. 
 
2. The E-Condition 
In some respects, it is misleading to speak of “the precautionary principle” as though there is a standard 
interpretation of the principle.9 There is not.10 Even more, several distinct kinds of principles are often 
conflated under the description of the precautionary principle.  For our purposes the more interesting 
interpretation of the principle is as a decision rule, as opposed to an argumentative tool or a rational 
constraint on what qualifies as an appropriate justification for failing to take action, in certain 
circumstances.11  
 When the precautionary principle is interpreted as a decision rule, it states conditions under 
which action is rationally mandated. Though there is not a standard substantive interpretation of the 
precautionary principle as a decision rule12, there is, however, a logical core that supports a version of the 
precautionary principle that could most plausibly be viewed as a rational decision rule.13  As a decision 
rule, the precautionary principle can be understood as composed of three central elements: a damage 
condition (D), an epistemological condition (E), and a suggested remedy (R), such that: If D and E are 
satisfied, then R is prescribed, or activated.14 On this line of thinking: if there is sufficient epistemic 
confidence that an activity under consideration will bring about a damage of a certain degree  of severity, 
then this is sufficient grounds for regulating (in some way) the activity. As pointed out by e.g. Sandin 
(1999), Manson (2002) and Munthe (2011), different versions of the precautionary principle can be 
                                                      
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point. 
10 See Aven (2011) and Munthe (2011). See also Manson (2002), Bodansky (1992) and Peterson (2006). 
11 For discussions of different ways of interpreting the precautionary principle, see Aven (2011) and Munthe (2011). 
See also Harris & Holm (1999), Sandin (1999) and the San Francisco Precaution Ordinance, (2002). An example of 
the precautionary principle presented, albeit unhelpfully vaguely, as a decision rule is found in article 191 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EU); this treaty describes the principle as “enabling rapid 
response in the face of a possible danger to human, animal or plant health, or to protect the environment. In 
particular, where scientific data do not permit a complete evaluation of the risk, recourse to this principle may, for 
example, be used to stop distribution or order withdrawal from the market of products likely to be hazardous.” See 
also, for instance, the 2002 UK-ILGRA statement of the precautionary principle, the Wingspread Statement on the 
Precautionary Principle and the 1998 Vancouver Statement on the Globalization and the Industrialization of 
Agriculture. 
12 See, for instance, Morris (2000) and Peterson (2006). 
13 For instance, the Science and Environmental Health Network, in response to the critique that the principle is ill 
defined, remarks (as Montague (2008) puts it, that) “in all formulations of the precautionary principle, we find three 
elements”, where these elements are the damage, epistemological and remedy elements that correspond with 
Manson (2002) and Peterson (2006). 
14 For a table representing different versions of the principle, as functions of the different ways of interpreting the 
damage, epistemological and remedy concepts, see Manson (2002: 267). For a further presentation of different 
versions of the precautionary principle, see Morris (Op. Cit.) "Defining the Precautionary Principle" in Morris, ed. 
Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle (Woburn, Mass.: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2000). 
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viewed as functions of the comparative strengths of the D, E and R conditions, as specified in whatever 
substantive version of the principle one defends. The following formulation, adopted by the British 
government in a White Paper on environmental management, serves as a good illustration: 
 
The precautionary principle applies particularly where there are good grounds for judging either that action 
taken promptly at comparatively low cost may avoid more costly damage later, or that irreversible effects may 
follow if action is delayed.15 
 
Similar relationships between the potential damage caused by an action and the epistemic features of the 
situation at hand have been proposed by e.g. Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982) and Levi (1990) for other 
decision rules. However, these authors do advocate, or discuss, the precautionary principle.  
Having said that, we believe that the straightforward interpretation of the precautionary 
principle’s logical core outlined above is oversimplified, in a way that is misleading.16 The epistemically 
significant aspects of the precautionary principle cannot be captured simply by specifying a certain degree 
of epistemic strength that is supposed to mark the relevant epistemic state. To appreciate the point, 
consider that the object toward which we take an epistemic attitude in precautionary contexts will always 
be a proposition that makes direct reference to the relevant damage condition. Importantly, though, the 
object of our epistemic attitude will not be a proposition that expresses merely that some specified 
damage will occur, or is likely to occur. After all, one’s epistemic position with respect to some likelihood 
that some damage will be brought about provides grounds for taking action against some activity A only if 
the evidence that one has supports a certain connection between A and the relevant damage. One 
plausible way of interpreting this connection is as a causal connection.  
Some causal propositions do not contain operators. For instance, “Methyltrexate causes a 
lowering of the immune system.”17 Here, the connection between cause and effect is left unqualified. 
Often, though, the causal propositions we use in practical deliberations are not “all or nothing” in this 
sense, particularly in cases where the precautionary principle would be germane.18 For example, the 
United Kingdom Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (UK-ILGRA) claims that, by 
reference to the precautionary principle, prevention remedies are actionable only when there is “good 
reason” to believe “that harmful effects may occur could be demonstrated by empirical evidence.”19  
The logical core of the precautionary principle must, we suggest, be revised to account for the two 
epistemically significant elements that the enaction of a remedy/restriction on an activity should be 
sensitive to: (i) the epistemic strength with respect to the entire causal proposition (specifying an action 
                                                      
15 White Paper: ”This Common Inheritance: Britain’s Environmental Strategy”, HM Govt, 1990, our emph.  
16 See Manson (Op. cit: 267) who, for example, suggests the following as potential epistemological conditions: 
possible, suspected, reasonable to think. 
17 This proposition of course could of course be adjusted so that it is qualified—for example, “There’s a .9 
likelihood that methyltrexate will lower the immune system of a given human.” The point here is that, as stated, that 
proposition “Methyltrexate causes a lowering of the immune system” is unqualified.  
18 This point has a venerable tradition in Bayesian epistemology. 
19 Our emphasis. See the full 2002 UK-ILGRA document here: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/committees/ilgra/pppa.pdf 
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and a damage), and (ii) the epistemic strength of the operator at play in the causal proposition itself. 
Notice how both of these epistemic elements could be independently adjusted: 
 
 
 
 
(i) Second-order E-condition  {First-order E-condition  (Activity     Damage)} 
 
       
 
Because the contents of the relevant causal propositions themselves are typically epistemologically loaded, 
specifying the “E-condition” in the precautionary principle is not as simple as citing some degree of 
strength N.20 After all, for two activities, A and B, and some damage threat (say, the extinction of a 
salmon species), you can know with perfect certainty that A is .30 percent likely to bring about the 
extinction of the species, and have a weakly justified belief  that B is .80 likely to bring about the 
extinction of the same species. Which epistemological situation best justifies a restriction on the activities 
in question? It seems that the right answer will require reference to some principle that we can appeal to 
justify weighting mixtures of epistemic states and probabilistic contents of those states.  
 In §4 we will consider a problem that arises for the purposes of weighing the epistemic mixtures 
introduced above, but first, in §3, we want to introduce a epistemological puzzle that faces any defender 
of the precautionary principle—a puzzle which we take to be theoretically prior to the problem of how to 
weigh the relevant epistemic mixtures. 
  
3. The first epistemological puzzle 
In this section we introduce and evaluate a dilemma for proponents of the precautionary principle that 
arises as a result of an appeal, by analogy, to a straightforward line of reasoning in the literature on 
contextualism in epistemology.21 Contextualists about knowledge (e.g. DeRose 1992; 1999, Cohen 2004) 
                                                      
20 Again, this is because, within the propositional content that is the object of the epistemic state, we have operators 
in whose scope is the causal connection. While the operator will rarely be a necessity operator, it will in many cases 
be a probability operator, or some type of non-probabilistic operator that nonetheless captures the agent’s 
confidence about the causal connection. For example, one can have good evidence that activity A is likely to bring 
about damage D. One might also know that A tends to bring about D.  
21 The most common line of contextualistm is attributor contextualism (e.g. DeRose 1992; Cohen 2004) according to 
which the relevant standards are those of the attributor. 
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hold that the conditions under which one counts as knowing a proposition are sensitive to what is at 
stake in the relevant context.22  
Suppose my evidence that the bank is open this Saturday consists in my having read a sign that 
says so. The contextualist allows that this evidence might be good enough for me to qualify as knowing in 
a context in which little to nothing rides on the matter of whether the bank is open, while the very same 
evidence fails to provide me with knowledge that the bank is open in a context in which my friend's life 
depends on the bank being open so that I can wire money this Saturday.  
The key point here can be framed in terms of a dependence insight: the standards one must meet to 
qualify as knowing depend on how much is at stake.23 Interestingly, the same kinds of practical 
considerations that motivate contextualists to take a rating of an epistemic state to depend on the 
contextually relevant practical stakes might lead a defender of the precautionary principle to reason along 
broadly similar lines:  the more severe the anticipated damage, the less certain we must be that some activity 
threatens that damage in order to be warranted in acting to regulate the activity. On this way of thinking, 
the way we fill out the epistemological condition depends on how we fill out the damage condition, as the 
former is sensitive to the latter. 
To clarify the connection between contextualism about knowledge, on the one hand, and 
contextualism about the epistemic standards operative in the precautionary principle, on the other, it is 
helpful to consider the respective correlations at play. In the case of knowledge attributions, the dependence 
of standards on the severity of what’s at stake is a positive correlation: the more significant the practical 
stakes, the higher the epistemic standard one must meet to qualify as possessing knowledge. However, in 
cases where application of the precautionary would be germane, the dependence of standards on the 
severity of what’s at stake appears to be a negative, or inverse, correlation: the greater the severity of the 
anticipated damage, the lower the epistemic standard that needs to be met for the relevant remedy to be 
warranted. 
On first blush, a contextualist approach to the precautionary principle looks to have a lot going 
for it. In particular, it seems to generate the right results in high-stakes and low-stakes cases. Restricting 
some activity with little expected damage would appear draconian if the evidence is scant, while perfectly 
sensible if the anticipated damage were massively catastrophic. Such an approach would seem, then, to 
have some clear theoretical advantages over an invariantist approach to the precautionary principle, 
                                                      
22 As DeRose (1999) puts it, “the truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing and knowledge denying sentences 
(sentences of the form “S knows that P’ and “S doesn’t know that P’ and related variants of such sentences) vary in 
certain ways according to the contexts in which they are uttered. What so varies is the epistemic standards that S 
must meet (or, in the case of a denial of knowledge, fail to meet) in order for such a statement to be true. (DeRose 
1999: 187). 
23 According to a rival position that aims to preserve a similar insight—that standards for knowing vary across 
context—what fixes the standards are the practical interests of the subject, as opposed to the ascriber of the epistemic 
state. This position is called subject-sensitive invariantism, and has been defended by (among others) Stanley (2005) and 
Hawthorne (2004).  
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according to which the requisite epistemic standards that must be satisfied are held fixed across 
contexts.24 
There is, however, a special problem that arises for one who defends a contextualist version of 
the precautionary principle, and it is a problem not faced in the same way by contextualists about 
knowledge in epistemology. The problem emerges once we consider that, if we want to preserve the 
insight that how much we must know about some activity’s connection to a damage in order to restrict 
that activity depends on how severely we rate the anticipated damage, then we are in effect saying that the 
severity of the damage condition circumscribes what the relevant epistemic standards will be (relevant, 
that is, to justifying the restriction of some activity).  
The problem is that, in situations where an application of the precautionary principle is germane, 
we have competing interests at play, and the extent to which the severity of some anticipated damage is 
judged is (in many cases) going to vary with respect to whose interests are at stake. Take (again) as an 
example of an anticipated damage, the extinction of a species of salmon in Alaska. In light of the interests 
of the environmental regulatory body, this damage is severe (and, accordingly, the epistemic standards 
that must be met in order to justify restricting the activity would be low). But in light of the interests of a 
construction company that wishes to build in Alaska, this damage is not severe (and, accordingly, the 
epistemic standards that must be met in order to justify restricting the activity are not low).25 A 
contextualist approach to the precautionary principle, then, seems like it could be plausible as a decision 
rule only if supplemented with some additional favouring rule, a rule which adjudicates whose interests 
determine the severity of the damage in question, a severity that (for the contextualist) is what fixes the 
relevant epistemic standard that must be satisfied.26 
Taking a step back, then, we can see how a larger puzzle emerges. The puzzle takes the form of a 
dilemma.  In circumstances in which the precautionary principle is advocated as a decision rule we ask: 
should the epistemic standards that must be met depend on the severity of the anticipated damage? The invariantist says 
no, and the contextualist says yes. If a defender of the precautionary principle goes the invariantist route, 
she lacks any principled way to explain why threats of (say) massive irreversible catastrophe warrant 
special treatment, i.e. why we need to know less to justifiably restrict threatening activities. This is the first 
horn of the dilemma.  
                                                      
24 Cf.  Classical invariantism vis-a-vis knowledge attributions, according to which, as Black (2005) puts it “the truth 
conditions of knowledge attributions depend neither on the subject’s context nor on the attributor’s context.” 
25 An actual, and much more extreme case occurred in Texas in 2012; a $15 million dollar highway construction 
project was put on hold for several weeks because the believed-to-be-extinct Braken Bat Cave meshweaver spider 
was spotted on the construction site. Environmentalists (whose interests were heeded) and construction workers 
differed profoundly on the significance of the potential damage which would be the spider’s extinction. 
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/trending-now/endangered-spider-halts-construction-15-million-texas-highway-
174932636.html 
26 The analogue of such a rule, in the epistemology literature—where contextualism about knowledge is what’s at 
issue—is a rule staying whose interests determine whether one knows, in a context. Here, attributor contextualists 
say that the relevant interests that fix the standards are the interests of the attributor; the subject-sensitive invariantist 
claims it is always the subject’s interests—the subject to whom the epistemic state is being attributed. Whereas the 
generation of such a rule in the debate about contextualism about knowledge just amounts to allowing for different 
theory choices, the generation of such a rule, for one who proposes a contextualist treatment of the precautionary 
principle, would involve a rule that would appear to be an unfair kind of favouring.  
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If the defender of the precautionary principle answers yes, and goes the contextualist route, she 
will be forced to supplement her position with some additional favouring rule, which adjudicates whose 
interests (e.g. the regulatory body’s or the developer’s) are relevant to assessing the extent of the 
anticipated damage.  
Rejecting the invariantist route constitutes a “horn’ of the dilemma because the most natural 
ways to defend such a needed favouring rule run into serious, perhaps intractable, problems. Consider an 
especially sensitive proposal: if, relative to anyone’s interest, the damage in question is taken to be severe, 
then this is sufficient for lowering the epistemic standards that must be met in order to restrict some 
activity that threatens that (anticipated) damage. The sensitive position is far too sensitive. For nearly any 
possible damage, there is likely someone for whom the damage is judged as severe. The sensitive proposal 
would seem to make the epistemic standards problematically low in all precautionary contexts27.  
Consider then an egalitarian favouring rule: all interests count equally, in assessing the severity of 
the damage (which, itself, fixes the epistemic standard at play). To see why the egalitarian favouring rule--
though initially promising--won’t work, let’s take another cue from contextualism in epistemology. For 
example, suppose John’s life depends on his being able to wire money to some loan-sharks (today), and 
what’s at issue is whether he counts as knowing that the only bank around is open (today). Randall, who 
is discussing the issue with John, is a nihilist, and has no interest in John’s fate. The insight motivating 
(attributor) contextualists is that the stakes are higher for John than for Randall, and this is supposed to 
explain why the truth value of “John knows the bank is open” can differ depending on whose interests 
are at stake in the context of utterance. Now the rub is that an egalitarian favouring rule would imply that 
the truth value of “John knows the bank is open” is invariant across context of utterances, fixed by a 
standard that is something like a mean of all (relevant) standards. But if such a mean standard always fixes 
the truth value of knowledge attributions, the knowledge attributions simply aren’t context sensitive. For 
instance, with reference to such a mean, there is no way to account for why John (but not Randall) needs a 
stronger epistemic position to know, when the stakes are raised for him (John). 
A parallel problem emerges when we apply this strategy in the precautionary context. After all, 
given the entrenched interests of (for example) developers and environmental regulatory bodies, the mean 
of all relevant standards for damage will typically be insensitive to differences in actual damage.28 But 
sensitivity to the severity of actual damage is precisely what contextualist approaches can claim, as a key 
advantage, over invariantist approaches. 
 The egalitarian favouring rule, in a precautionary context, would therefore mutatis mutandis convert 
the attempted contextualist approach into a kind of invariantism and thus be faced with the same 
problem facing other invariantist approaches to the precautionary principle: that, plausibly, we need to 
                                                      
27 As we’ll see in §4, if the standards are too low, a conflict with de minimis emerges.  
28 Suppose the issue is developing a project that poses some threat to the environment. It is in the developer’s 
interest to downplay severity of damage, regardless of the actual damage expected; likewise, it is in the environmental 
agency’s advantage to prevent development even if actual expected damage is low. Plausibly, the mean of these 
standards will be fixed across cases where the degree of actual expected damage varies. 
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know less to justifiably restrict some threatening activities than others, and the invariantist approach can’t 
explain this. 
A third proposal would be to contextualise the favouring rule itself. Let SEVERITYR represent the 
severity of a damage, D, as assessed by some regulatory body R, and let SEVERITYI represent the severity 
of D as assessed by some industry I. On our third proposal, the relevant epistemic standards depend on 
the severity of the anticipated damage, and (in our example) in some contexts this will be SEVERITYR and 
in other contexts SEVERITYI. This approach effectively passes the buck.  In the absence of a further 
favouring rule, which adjudicates which assessments of the severity of damage matter for fixing the 
epistemic standards in which contexts, this third contextualist approach to the precautionary principle 
falls short of a decision rule. 
 
4. The second epistemological puzzle 
In this section we introduce our second epistemological puzzle. Its point of departure is the widely 
accepted claim, defended by several authors working on the precautionary principle, that any reasonable 
formulation of the principle has to be combined with the de minimis principle, according to which 
sufficiently improbable risks should be ignored.29 If a mere possibility that an activity may cause some 
damage would be sufficient for justifying precautionary measures, then this would put far too much 
restrictions on what we are allowed to do. In his recent book The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk, 
Munthe explains this standard view very clearly: 
 
PP has to employ some limit on how unlikely a risk-scenario of an activity can be in order for this activity 
to be within PP’s range of applicability. Otherwise, even the most trivial activity would have to be 
subjected to the requirements of PP, since everything we do might … produce some kind of [sufficiently] 
undesirable outcome.30 
 
 It would be absurd to take precautionary measures against, say, doses of radiation that are smaller than 
one percent of the natural background level, or against increases of PbB levels below 10ug/dl, or against 
the 1-in-19 billion lifetime risk of getting cancer from certain food additives.31 According to the de minimis 
principle these risks are so small that they ought to be ignored, and given that they are, the precautionary 
principle ought to be applied only to risks “above the threshold”.  
 The de minimis principle stems from the Latin phrase de minimis non curat lex, which is a legal 
principle meaning that the court should not concern itself with trifles. For instance, if you steal one cent 
that would in a strict sense count as theft. However, since the amount is so small the court should apply 
                                                      
29 The claim that a reasonable version of the precautionary principle has to be combined with the de minimis principle 
is defended by e.g. Peterson (2002), Sandin (2004:21), Clarke (2005), Steele (2006), Ashford (2007), and Zander 
(2010:72) . 
30 Munthe (2011: 24). Note that Munthe then goes on to formulate a general objcetion to the de minimis principle, 
which we shall not discuss here. 
31 Whipple (1987). 
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the de minimis clause and refrain from taking up the case. The idea that sufficiently trivial risks are beyond 
concern was introduced in the 1980’s by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA 
argued that a very large number of different substances can in principle cause cancer, but some 
cancerogenic substances are so unlikely to cause cancer in the quantities they are actually being used, 
meaning that those risks are de minimis and ought to be ignored. The de minimis principle has in recent 
years become widely accepted by risk professionals. 
In the literature on de minimis, various probabilistic thresholds have been proposed for when a 
risk is so small that it should be ignored.32 However, it is worth keeping in mind that the de minimis 
principle does not require that we are able to establish precisely what the relative frequency of some event 
it is. The probability limit could be interpreted as a subjective probability (as assessed by the relevant 
experts); then all that has to be established is that the probability is below the relevant limit. 
That said, contrary to what is often recognized in the literature, it is not sufficient to merely 
establish a first-order epistemic threshold by stipulating that, say, a life-time risk below one in a billion is 
de minimis. We also have to establish a second-order epistemic threshold, which tells us how certain it is 
that a risk really is so small that it falls below the threshold. In order to see this, recall the E-condition 
stated in §2, according to which the enaction of a remedy or restriction on an activity should be sensitive 
to (i) the epistemic strength with respect to the entire causal proposition (specifying an action and a 
damage), and (ii) the epistemic strength of the operator at play in the causal proposition itself.  
Let us illustrate this point in an example. Imagine that you estimate the probability that a person 
will get cancer from substance X to be one in a billion. This is in itself not sufficient for concluding that 
the risk is de minimis, because your assessment of the probability may be highly uncertain. This type of  
uncertainty can be rendered more precise by distinguishing between first- and second-order probability. 
In our example, the first-order probability is the probability that substance X will cause cancer. The 
second-order probability refers to the probability that the assessment of the first-order probability is 
correct. 
Note that if the second-order probability (that the first-order probability is correct) is low, then 
the risk is not de minimis. For instance, if the probability is .01 that the probability is one in a billion that 
substance XYZ will cause cancer, it would be ridiculous to claim that XYZ is de minimis. The actual first-
order probability could be much higher. This insight is what drives the second epistemological puzzle, 
because it is far from obvious how the defender of the precautionary principle should combine the two 
types of probability (or any other measure of the two types of epistemic strength that figure in the E-
condition; see §2) into an adequate threshold for de minimis risks.  
The second epistemological puzzle can be formulated as a dilemma. The dilemma could be stated 
in a purely qualitative vocabulary (by using terms such as “highly unlikely” and “almost certain”) but in 
what follows we will state it in a probabilistic vocabulary, mainly because this makes it easier to follow the 
argument. In order to bring out the first horn of the dilemma, consider the suggestion that the correct 
                                                      
32 See Whipple (1987) and Peterson (2002). 
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way of dealing with the two types of uncertainty is to multiply the second-order probability by the first-
order probability, thereby reducing the two measures of uncertainty to a single measure.  It takes little 
reflection to see that this approach does not work in discussions of the de minimis principle, because if we 
multiply a small number (the first-order probability) by another small number (the second-order 
probability), then the all-things-considered probability will be even smaller. For instance, 0.01 x 10-9 = 10-
11. It then follows that the less certain we are that the second-order assessment is correct, the smaller will the 
all-things-considered risk be, everything else being equal. This is clearly the wrong conclusion. Intuitively, 
it would make more sense to apply the precautionary principle if the first-order probability is highly 
uncertain, which is the opposite of what the multiplicative rule suggests. 
From a mathematical point of view, this problem could of course be dealt with by “turning 
around” the probability. Instead of calculating the all-things-considered probability that X is dangerous 
(causes cancer), one could calculate the all-things-considered probability that X is safe (does not cause 
cancer). It would then follow that the all-things-considered probability that X is safe is lower than the 
first-order probability that X is safe, which is arguably the correct conclusion. In the example above we 
get 0.01 x (1 – 10-9) < (1 – 10-9). The problem with this line of reasoning is that it is ad hoc. We get the 
result we want, but we seem to have no good epistemic reason that explains why this way of carrying out 
the calculation is correct and the other way incorrect. 
Note that our point does not hinge on the fact that we multiply the two types of probabilities. 
The worry is more general. On the one hand, if the second-order probability is low this should make the 
all-things-considered probability even lower, since this makes it more unlikely that that the first-order 
assessment is correct. Hence, the precautionary principle is less likely to be applicable. At the same time, 
the mere fact that the second-order assessment is less likely to be correct, is actually a reason for applying 
the precautionary principle, and not declaring the risk to be de minimis. No matter which minimally 
plausible rule we use for aggregating first- and second-order probabilities into an all-things-considered 
probability, we seem to face a tension between two incompatible intuitions.  
We are now in a position to bring out the second horn of the dilemma, which arises if we refrain 
from combing the two measures of uncertainty into an all-things-considered measure. So let us suppose 
that the threshold for what should count as de minimis is determined by considering each type of 
uncertainty separately. Arguably, the de minimis threshold has to be sensitive to what is at stake. (See the 
discussion of contextualism above.) In a high stake case, a risk is de minimis only if the first-order 
probability is sufficiently low that something bad will happen and there is little second-order uncertainty 
about the accuracy of this first-order assessment. However, in a low-stake case, a risk would be  de minimis 
even if the first-order probability is somewhat higher that something bad will happen and even if there is 
somewhat more second-order uncertainty about the accuracy of the first-order assessment.  
In order to spell out the problem that arises if we insist on not aggregating the two measures of 
uncertainty into a unified measure, it is helpful to keep the stakes fixed. So let us suppose that D is one 
additional death in cancer. Now consider a case in which the second-order probability is just above the 
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threshold and the first-order probability is just below the relevant limit. That is, the second-order 
probability is sufficiently high that the first-order probability is sufficiently small; hence, the risk is de 
minimis, meaning that advocates of the precautionary principle can safely ignore it. Next consider a parallel 
case in which the first order probability is much smaller, at the same time as the second-order probability is 
just a tiny bit smaller and falls right below the relevant threshold. It follows that the risk in the second case 
is not de mimimis, which seems to be the wrong conclusion. Intuitively, since the first-order probability is 
much lower, it should not matter that the second-order probability is just a tiny bit lower. 
The second horn of the dilemma can, of course, be formulated in a more general way. The 
problem is that if we refrain from aggregating the two measures into a combined measure, we have to 
introduce thresholds. But as soon as we introduce two or more thresholds, we can always imagine cases in 
which small changes to one threshold lead to a “too big” effect on the overall assessment. The only way 
to avoid this type of threshold effects is to aggregate all uncertainties into a combined measure (and then 
optimize with respect to that single measure), but if we pursue that strategy we face the first horn of the 
dilemma. 
An additional problem with allowing second-order uncertainty to play a role in the final analysis 
is that it seems to be arbitrary to stop at that level. Why not allow for third- and fourth-order uncertainty 
as well?  This leads us to a familiar  regress problem. We leave it to the reader to adjudicate whether the 
regress is vicious or benign. 
 
5. Conclusion 
A defender of the precautionary principle who aims to present the principle as a normatively reasonable 
decision rule must be prepared to rigorously defend the principle. We hope to have shown here that 
several serious challenges to defending a theoretically satisfactory version of the principle turn on the 
importance of getting the epistemological condition in the precautionary principle right. As our discussion 
has suggested, this will be a challenge that requires bridging risk analysis and the theory of knowledge.  
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